We study the effect of different information sources on diffusion between and within companies.
Introduction
Inter-firm technology diffusion is the process of technological spread between companies, while intra-firm diffusion is the process of spread within companies. Recent studies in the industrial economics literature have compared determinants of the two (Battisti et al, 2007; Battisti and Stoneman, 2003; Battisti et al, 2005; Fuentelsaz et al, 2003; Hollenstein and Woerter, 2008) . A promise of the work is that it can illuminate the mechanisms driving intra-firm diffusion by contrast with the more extensively investigated inter-firm diffusion.
A determinant neglected in the industrial economics literature is the role of sources providing information about technology. The determinant is important for many reasons. Information provision is a primary means of governmental influence on technology adoption (Stoneman and David, 1986) . UK companies spent an estimated UK£7.6 billion in 2005 on management consultancy, with a fifth on IT-related consultancy alone (Marrano and Haskel, 2006) . The management consultancy industry employs tens of thousands of UK workers (Marrano and Haskel, 2006) . Prominent theories of intra-firm diffusion emphasise how information acquisition can explain diffusion (Mansfield, 1968; Stoneman, 1981) , and the potential role of learning is recognised in the empirical intra-firm literature even when it is not a primary concern (Battisti and Stoneman, 2005) .
Unlike the industrial economics literature, the agricultural economics literature has treated the issue to an extent, reflecting the debates on governmental extension programs (Anderson and Feder, 2004; Evenson, 2001) , the large expenditures on information acquisition (Ortmann et al, 1993) , the sizable advertising and outreach budgets by input suppliers (Gloy et al, 2000) , and the large number of information providers (the UK Association of Independent Crop Consultants website www.aicc.org.uk reports 244 members in August 2013). The literature has treated the choice of information by farmers (Foltz et al, 1996; Gloy et al, 2000; Wolf et al, 2001) , the role of information in initial adoption (Garcia-Jimenez et al. 2011; Lapple and Van Rensberg, 2011; Wozniak, 1993) , and determinants of sequential adoption (Aldana et al, 2011; Khanna, 2001 ). Yaron et al (1992) look at how extension services affect an index including thoroughness of adoption of five farming technologies. Most relevant to our paper is Genius et al (2006) , who look at partial or full adoption of organic farming with active or passive information collection as determinants of the extent of adoption, and as jointly determined variables.
The prior work in both the industrial and agricultural literature leaves much unknown about how information affects inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion. In this paper, we examine the comparative impact of information sources on inter and intra diffusion in more detail. We aim to distinguish the impact by the amount and character of the information, with our results formulated in comparative terms between the two types of diffusion.
We start by presenting our theoretical model. It describes learning about, and how to use, a technology through information acquisition. Learning is Bayesian, following the normal-normal updating in Stoneman (1981) , Young (2009) , and Aldana et al (2011) , and with information characterised by its updating parameters. The model identifies an inter-firm stage where the company learns that a new technology is profitable and an intra-firm stage where the company learns how to use it profitably. Information sources are costly to use and their selection is based on profit maximisation.
Our model produces results similar to those in dual process persuasion theory (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1980; Kruglanski and Thompson, 1999) . It implies that different sources of information will be influential at the inter-firm and intra-firm stages. In inter-firm diffusion, information's value arises from small increases in expected returns from undertaking a technological trial. As its value is often low prior to adoption, it will be used to assess the value of a trial if it does not require expensive processing to use. Thus, reliable or readily accessible information from sources like suppliers, government, farmers, and agricultural magazines will be influential on inter-firm adoption.
For intra-firm adoption, information's value can be large if it significantly improves the use of the technology, and so the extent of adoption. An expensive but value-creating source will be preferentially used to evaluate levels of intra-firm adoption over an inexpensive but non-informative one. Such value-creating sources plausibly include buyers, consultants, academics, and government. We test our model using a cross section 574 UK farmers surveyed in 2007, looking at the extent of their adoption of organic farming technologies. It also contains demographic data, and description of the information sources that they use. Our empirical specifications allow both for information exogeneity and endogeneity. In the former case, we run probit and linear models, and in the latter case we use bivariate probit and treatment effect models. We find that our theoretical results on inter-firm and inter-firm technology adoption hold. Specifically, we find that information from agents, suppliers, farmers, and agricultural magazines is mainly influential on inter-firm adoption.
Information from buyers is largely used for intra-firm adoption, while information from crop consultants, academics, government, and an industry body is used for both forms of diffusion.
We make a number of theoretical contributions. The paper presents a new model of inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion including information usage. Unlike previous models of technology adoption using dual process persuasion theory (Angst and Agarwal, 2009; Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2006; Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2009; Moser and Mosler, 2008) , we derive its results as an outcome of optimising economic behaviour prior to testing them. The model is the first of which we aware to allow prediction of the disaggregated information sources used in technological adoption, and it demonstrates qualitative differences in information sources used in the two diffusion stages.
Empirically, the paper demonstrates the validity of the theoretical model in the case of UK organic farming adoption, and determines which information sources affect diffusion to a more detailed degree than in prior work. The results readily lead to contrasts and complementarities with existing literature, and implications for further work and policy.
Section two looks at our theoretical framework and section three describes our data. Section four presents our estimation procedure, results are in section five, and section six concludes.
Theoretical framework
In this section we present our theoretical framework on adoption in the presence of information, and the hypotheses that follow from it. Our model is based on Bayesian learning, as is common in the literature (Baerenklau, 2005; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Grossman et al, 1977; Leathers and Smale. 1991; Kihlstrom, 1976) . In particular we use the normal-normal updating of Stoneman (1981) , Young (2009), and Aldana et al (2011) . Different types of information are characterised by their updating effects. Our model allows for prediction of which information types influence inter-firm and intra-firm adoption.
Our results are similar to those produced in dual approach persuasion theory, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980; Chen and Chaiken, 1999) . Broadly, in these dual process models people may be persuaded by either rational processing or heuristic cues. Rational processing requires more effort, and greater personal involvement in the outcomes is more likely to 5 result in it (Johnson and Eagly, 1989; Petty et al, 1983) . Heuristic cues include perceptions of message source reliability, and are followed when there is less receiver involvement in the outcome.
In our model, inter-firm diffusion necessitates less information processing for cost reasons, and sources are heuristically selected based on their perceived reliability. Intra-firm diffusion involves higher returns and the company is more involved in the outcomes, so spends more time undertaking rational processing and analysing source information. Use available information to form expectations of general technology performance.
Adopt a single copy of the technology in a trial.
Is the expected profit following a trial positive?
Exit.
Use available information to form judgements of optimal technology implementation.
Is the expected profit from adoption positive?
Adopt as much of the technology as is profitable.
The framework is given in two sections, with the first describing inter-firm adoption and the second describing intra-firm diffusion. The scheme is shown in the flowchart in Figure 1 .
Inter-firm adoption
There is a risk neutral, profit maximising company which can produce a good by using a new technology. The expected profit from use of the first copy of the technology is P, net of technology acquisition and other costs.
The company is unaware of the expected profit P, and thinks that it has a distribution ) , ( The company has a prior distribution for P of ) , ( It follows that, after inclusion of information, the expected income from production using the
. A trial will result in investment if the expected income is revealed to exceed zero. Using standard results on censored normal distributions (see Greene 7 (2008), pp.870-1), the expected value to the company from a trial is
A trial will be undertaken if the expected profit exceeds k, the cost of a trial. The value of the option to undertake a trial is thus
, taking the value of X as given. Integrating over the distribution of X gives the expected value of the information as
. The value of the information is strictly positive as for sufficiently large X, the value of the first term is certain to exceed k. The information will be used if its value exceeds its cost, c, so any information that is sufficiently cheap will be used. We expect information that can be used without much effort validating it will be inexpensive to use. Such information may come from reliable sources whose information is accepted without extensive checking. We may expect reliable sources to include crop consultants, extension agents, academics, government agencies, and professional bodies.
Readily accessible (and therefore inexpensive) information may also be expected from sources including farmers and agricultural magazines.
Intra-firm diffusion
We next present our model of information's effect on intra-firm diffusion. For notational convenience, we recycle the English and Greek letters used in the inter-firm model. During the trial, the company learns how to use the technology and decides on the appropriate adoption level. The company uses the technology by selecting numbers to form an m-vector
. Each combination can be used to produce the first copy of the good at vector
. Subsequent copies are subject to rising marginal costs, so that the cost C n of the n th good satisfies
for some set of constants k(n), where
. The minimal starting cost K is attained for an optimal technology use corresponding to setting ) ,..., (
Once the trial starts, the company is initially unsure of the optimal use of the technology and assumes that it has a multivariate normal distribution )) ,..., ( , Thus, the total expected costs are
An information source provides evidence about the optimal use, giving technical information about Thus, the variance falls after including the information. The expected costs for the first copy of the good also fall to
, and because
the costs of all later produced goods fall proportionately. Thus, the level of production (and hence adoption) at which costs equal the constant profit (that is, the n at which C n = P) rises as information is included.
If the source is highly informative about how to use one or more technological component, then the decline in production costs may be large enough to offset even quite large implementation costs, c. Such sources will affect the level of intra-firm adoption, whereas cheap sources that do not provide implementation information will not affect intra-firm adoption. Expensive, informative sources are likely to include consultants, academics, buyers, and possibly government and professional bodies.
Data
The data used in this study is from a survey of pest management practices by UK farmers (Bailey, 2012) They classify them into portfolios belonging to "intra-crop bio-controllers", "chemical 'users' / conservers", "extra-crop conservation bio-controllers", and "weed focussed farmers". There is overlap between the first two portfolios, with pheromone monitoring / control and different varieties in different fields occurring in both 1 . The groupings are shown in Table 1 .
Table 1
Alternative Commitment to use of alternative pest control technologies 1 = Not adopted and will not adopt 2 = Not adopted but will consider adoption 3 = Adopted but not currently used 4 = Adopted and currently used
For each practice, the commitment to use by each farmer is measured on scale of one to four. The meanings of each number are shown in Table 2 . There are 39 farmers who omit any statement about their commitment to use the technologies and a further seven who do not code for at least one of the technologies. We exclude them from our analysis. It is possible that they are uncertain about their past or future behaviour. Another possibility is that they have never adopted and never intend to, and should be classified as unity for all technologies. However, the possibility is less plausible if we examine the numbers of technologies that each farmer has committed to never using, where the data is not entirely missing. Table 3 shows the distribution of farmers by technology exclusion.
Most farmers rule out relatively few technologies, with almost a quarter ruling out no technologies and half excluding two or less. Only 14 percent exclude more than half of the technologies. So it seems unlikely that many farmers who omit their data would exclude all of the technologies. We also exclude a further six farmers who have missing data on other variables used in our analysis.
There remain 522 observations.
Table 3
Distribution of farmers by the number of technologies they have not used and never intend on using We calculate the extent of intra-firm adoption within each portfolio by summing the number of technologies within the portfolio that the farmer has ever adopted (so have commitments to use of three or four). We summarise the extent of use in Table 5 . Distributional statistics are shown for each portfolio, with percentages showing the statistics divided by the number of technologies in the portfolio. Mean intra-firm adoption rates are lower than inter-firm rates, ranging from 26 percent for the intra-crop bio-controller portfolio to 67 percent for the weed focussed portfolio. Thus, internal adoption is typically less than complete after initial adoption, as is found in Battisti and Stoneman (2003) . The other statistics indicate a wide dispersion of use. Dispersion is higher relative to the mean for less adopted portfolios. Percentages below the statistics are the statistics divided by the total number of technologies in the portfolio.
As an alternative method of intra-firm use, we could perform factor analyses on the portfolios and construct linear measures of adoption from the components that explain most of the variation in the data (Battisti and Iona, 2009 between-portfolio variation is allowed by the method but variation within-portfolio is not permitted, and we are unsure whether such constraints are valid.
We additionally extract survey data on information sources for the farmers. The survey asks what sources farmers use for anything related to farm management in general, and presents various options shown in Table 6 . For each source, farmers respond either never (coded as one), rarely (coded as two), occasionally (three), or frequently (four). We reduce the measures of information use to two levels, zero and one. The use measure equals zero if the source usage is coded as "never" or "rarely", and one if it is coded as "occasionally" or "frequently". Table 7 We also use various questions from the data to construct ancillary determinants for our equations.
These are both discrete and continuous variables. They are described in Table 8 and are separated into general data and data on pesticide use, in preparation for their later econometric use.
Table 8
Adoption and use determinants other than general information sources
General data
Arable 
Estimation procedure
In this section we describe our estimation procedure. Our theory proposes which sources of information will be associated with inter-firm and intra-firm adoption. There are a number of considerations that guide our empirical formulation and estimation. Firstly, it is likely that common included and omitted factors will influence both information use and technology choice. We therefore adopt a system of equations allowing for shared covariates and correlated error terms.
Secondly, the direct effects of information on technology choice are of interest, not just the indirect effect of shared influences. Thus, information should enter as a recursive determinant in the technology choice equations, as in Genius et al (2006) who use a trivariate ordered probit. As information is correlated with the technology error term through the correlation with the error term in its own use equation, it is endogenous in the adoption equation. Greene (2008, p823) shows that in the case of a recursive bivariate probit model, the endogeneity can be ignored in maximum likelihood estimation. An alternative to obtain parameter consistency would be use a two step procedure (as in Koundouri et al (2006) ). In the case of a bivariate probit-linear model with an endogenous variable, the well known Heckman correction can be applied to the second step of a treatment model (Greene, 2008 p.886f and p.889f). A third consideration in estimation is the number of parameters to be estimated. A system in which use of each information variable is simultaneously determined would proliferate parameters. One solution to this problem is to consider aggregates of information sources as is common in the literature (Genius, 2006; Wozniak, 1993; Wozniak, 1987) . However, as we wish to determine the effect of individual sources, this approach is not followed here. A related consideration also concerns feasibility of identification and estimation. The data allows for ordering of use and adoption. A multivariate ordered system would again have many parameters and it is also unclear if variable endogeneity can be ignored as in the bivariate probit model.
Given these considerations, we adopt two broad approaches. One is to estimate linear models containing all information variables as determinants and neglecting their endogeneity (as in Wozniak (1987) ). This approach makes allowance for their simultaneous effect. The other approach is to treat the individual information sources as endogenous in bivariate systems with technology adoption as the other determined variable. For the inter-firm model, a bivariate probit is used with information endogenous in the technology adoption equation. For the intra-firm model, a probit-linear model is used with technology as a treatment effect and a Heckman correction.
Influences on inter-firm adoption are tested through the following equations for technology
where z 1 is a latent variable, x 1 is a column vector of non-information determinants of technology adoption, i is a column vector of dummies equal to one for each information source used and zero otherwise, β 1 and γ are column vectors of coefficients with the same dimensions as x 1 and i respectively, ε 1 is a standard normal error term, and t is a dummy for inter-firm adoption for one of the technology portfolios.
We initially estimate equations (1) assuming that the determinant variables are all exogenous. We then introduce an information adoption equation
where x 2 is a vector of determinants that may overlap with x 1 , β 1 is its coefficient vector, and ε 2 is an error term. ε 1 and ε 2 are bivariate normal with zero means and a covariance matrix
further constrain the i and γ vectors to be one dimensional. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood.
The effects of information sources on intra-firm diffusion are tested using a linear model of technology adoption
where T is a measure of intra-firm adoption for one of the portfolios. x 1 , i, β 1 , and γ are the same as for equation (1), and ε 1 is a zero mean error term. Initial estimation is by OLS assuming determinant endogeneity. We then introduce the information use equation which is the same as equation (2) and in the parametric constraint, except for the joint distribution of the error terms. Now ε 1 and ε 2 are bivariate normal with zero means and a covariance matrix
. The model is estimated by full information maximum likelihood.
The set x 1 of non-information determinants of technology adoption is taken to be the general data variables in Table 8 , while the set of determinants of general information usage is taken to be the pesticide information variables in the table. Our reasoning for the latter choice is that pesticide information will have a much greater influence on the choice of general information sources than on organic technology adoption.
Our STATA code is to appear at our website with the next draft of this paper. The data used cannot be provided as its dissemination is restricted; nevertheless it is freely available to researchers at the UK Data Service website 2 . Table 9 shows estimated coefficients for the inter-firm technology adoption under the assumption of determinant exogeneity, and Table 10 shows the marginal effects. We comment on the latter.
Empirical results
For the intra-crop bio-controller portfolio, academic information has a large and significantly significant effect on adoption. The effect is moderately large and less significant for independent crop consultant and supplier information, and less for buyer information with ten percent significance. All of these information sources increase adoption. The strongest effects are due to reliable or supply side information sources.
The chemical user portfolio estimates are shown in the next column. Independent crop consultants have a moderately sized and highly significant positive effect on technology adoption. Agents have a smaller, moderately significant negative effect, while suppliers also have a small, but weakly significant and negative, impact.
The third column has coefficients for informational influences on adoption by extra-crop biocontrollers. Agent information has moderate positive economic and statistical effects on technology adoption. The agricultural magazine Farmers Weekly has a similar, but negative effect.
Coefficients for influential information sources on weed focussed farmers are shown in the final column. Academics have an economically small and weakly significant negative effect on adoption.
Farmer information has a similar, but positive effect. Information from the Voluntary Initiative website is associated with a moderately large, five percent significant effect.
In summary, we do find evidence for reliable, supply side information having an effect on adoption. Standard errors are shown below the coefficients. * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. Standard errors are shown below the coefficients. * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance.
In Table 11 we see estimated information coefficients for inter-firm diffusion when the determinants are taken as endogenous, and the marginal effects are in Table 12 . The first column in Table 12 shows the marginal effects on adoption in the intra-crop bio-controller portfolio.
Independent crop consultants have a moderately positive, and highly significant effect on adoption.
The effect of agents is similar. Academics have a large, positive, and highly significant effect on adoption. Suppliers have little effect. Buyer information has a large, positive, and highly significant effect on adoption, as does the Voluntary Initiative website. Information from the Farmers Guardian is associated with a small and positive increase in adoption, at one percent significance.
The effect of information sources on chemical user adoption is shown in the second column.
Independent crop consultants have a small but highly significant positive effect. Agent information has a similar but negative effect, while suppliers have a very small, negative, and one percent significant effect. The effect of farmer information is the same. Information from DEFRA has a small and weakly significant positive effect. Both the Farmers Weekly and Farmers Guardian print publications reduce adoption slightly, with one percent significance.
The third column shows information's effect on adoption in the extra-crop bio-controller portfolio.
Agents have a moderately large and highly significant positive effect. DEFRA information has a smaller positive effect, which is also highly significant, and the Voluntary Initiative website impact is the same. Information from Farmers Weekly moderately reduces adoption at one percent significance, while Farmers Guardian information increases it moderately with five percent significance.
Column four shows coefficients for information's influence on weed-focussed adoption.
Independent crop consultants have a small, positive effect that is one percent significance. A very small, highly significant reduction in adoption is due to use of agent information, and a slightly larger reduction with five percent significance is attributable to academic information. Farmers have a small, positive, highly significant influence, as does DEFRA. The Voluntary Initiative website is associated with a moderate economical and statistical positive effect, while Farmers
Weekly has a weak negative effect.
In summary, we have again found evidence that reliable, accessible information increases inter-firm adoption. To summarise, the results here broadly support our claim that intra-firm adoption will be influenced by technical information. Standard errors are shown below the coefficients. * denotes ten percent significance, ** denotes five percent significance, and *** denotes one percent significance. Table 14 presents estimated coefficients for information sources' effects on intra-firm diffusion when information is taken to be endogenous. Marginal effects are shown in Table 15 , and we comment on them. The first column in Table 15 Weekly is associated with a similar but negative effect on adoption.
Column four presents coefficients for information's effect on weed-focussed portfolio adoption.
Buyer information has a large, positive, and highly significant effect on adoption. The same is true for information from DEFRA, the Voluntary Initiative website, and the Farmers Guardian.
In summary, the estimates support our theoretical finding that technical information sources will be influential on intra-firm adoption. We summarise our findings compared with our expectations in Table 16 . The observed column is constructed by counting significance stars on the marginal effects in the inter-firm and intra-firm tables, and summing across the exogenous and endogenous totals for each diffusion type. There is broad agreement with our expected results. Sources that provide information on technological feasibility that may be used without much expense are found to influence inter-firm adoption, while sources of more detailed technological information that probably require more processing effort are revealed to influence intra-firm adoption.
Table 16
Sources of information, the expected types of diffusion that they influence, and the diffusion types they are empirically found to influence 
Conclusions
We have presented a model of the effect of information sources on inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion and tested it with UK farming data. Consistent with our model, we found evidence that inter-firm adoption is often driven by reliable and accessible information, while intra-firm adoption is often driven by technical information.
We find that information from farmers affects inter-firm adoption, but not intra-firm adoption. The result contrasts with Conley and Udry (2010)'s finding that such information adjusts the intra-farm level of adoption in Ghanaian pineapple growers. They find close response by farmers to communication within the farmers' information neighbourhoods, so it is unlikely that farmer information is just proxying for other forms of information that we have included but that they exclude. It is possible that different forms of information are suitable in Ghana for reasons omitted from our model. Verbal communication may be relatively ineffective for transfer of UK intra-firm farming information, or Ghanaians may be more willing to share information. Alternatively, as an extension to our model, Ghanaian farmer information may be more suitable for analytical processing than UK farmer information. Baerenklau (2005) looks at US farmers and finds that neighbourhood effects are not significant in their intra-firm adoption of new types of forage grasses, so conceivably the difference can be generalised to farmers in developing and developed countries.
Our theoretical and empirical models could be investigated further. The relative role of education in inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion could be assessed, and the comparative importance of economic and information determinants. The disclosure value associated with intra-firm diffusion could be examined, and the extent to which influences on inter-firm and intra-firm adoption crossover to each other. The extent to which information changes technology's effect on profitability could be examined.
We have lost some statistical content in forming dummies for informational use and technological adoption. We could investigate alternative econometric models in which the ordering of the original data is retained. As noted previously, the retention will create challenges in estimation for reasons of identification and consistency.
Our work has a number of policy implications. One is that information encouraging initial adoption without support for detailed implementation is not likely to promote full technological use. Another implication is that government information has a role in both inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion, although whether it is cost-effective is another issue. A further implication is that although UK farmers have some role in inter-firm adoption, their role in intra-firm adoption is not significant so network construction will not necessarily lead to much fuller diffusion.
